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Abstract. We consider interactive coding in a setting where n parties wish to compute a joint
function of their inputs via an interactive protocol over imperfect channels. We assume that
adversarial errors can comprise a O( 1
n
) fraction of the total communication, occurring anywhere
on the communication network. Our goal is to maintain a constant multiplicative overhead in
the total communication required, as compared to the error-free setting, and also to balance the
workload over the different parties. We build upon the prior protocol of Jain, Kalai, and Lewko,
but while that protocol relies on a single coordinator to shoulder a heavy burden throughout the
protocol, we design a mechanism to pass the coordination duties from party to party, resulting
in a more even distribution of communication over the course of the computation.
1 Introduction
The fundamental problem of errors in communication has been studied ever since the groundbreak-
ing work of Shannon [Sha48]. Due to his results, we know how to construct error-correcting codes
that achieve a constant information rate despite a constant error rate. In this paper, we study error
correction in the interactive setting, an area that was introduced by Schulman [Sch92], [Sch93]. In
particular, we are interested in this problem in the multi-party setting.
We note that it is insufficient to simply encode each message of the original interactive protocol
with a traditional, non-interactive error-correcting code. In the case of adversarial noise, this will
result in a poor error rate, since if k messages are sent in the protocol, the error-rate must be less than
1/k. After all, we can not allow even a single message to be fully corrupted without compromising the
correctness of the computation.
In this work, we show how to convert any n-party interactive protocol into a new protocol that is
resilient to Θ( 1
n
)-fraction of adversarial error, while incurring only a constant blow-up in the commu-
nication complexity CC.
This is similar to the properties achieved by the protocol in [JKL15], but we achieve a new addi-
tional feature. Namely, [JKL15] requires a single party to act as a “coordinator” of the entire computa-
tion, and that party must individually perform a constant fraction of the overall total communication.
In a distributed setting with n parties, we might naturally want the communication burden to be
more equally distributed over the course of the protocol. To ease the burden of central coordination,
we introduce new techniques that allow the role of the coordinator to be passed from party to party
in a rotating fashion, equalizing the communication over time. Thus, we do not require that any one
party Pi “lead” the computation for the entire time, and this avoids the resulting blowup in Pi’s
communication complexity.
1.1 Prior Work in the Multiparty Setting
Rajagopalan and Schulman [RS94] first extended the problem of error-resilient interactive coding to the
multi-party setting, and showed how to achieve error-resilience against stochastic errors. When there
are n parties communicating, their method has a communication complexity overhead of Θ(n2 logn).
The original protocol is converted to one that proceeds in rounds such that every party Pi sends a
message to all of its neighbors during each round. Therefore, if the original protocol is synchronous,
i.e. Ω(n2) bits are transmitted per round, and there is a Θ(log n)-factor overhead in the number of
rounds.
However, protocols are not always synchronous, an issue which Jain, Kalai, and Lewko addressed
[JKL15]. They consider an arbitrary n-party protocol π with static speaking order and at least one
party P* who shares a communication link with all other parties. In this context, they present a
compiler that converts π into a new protocol π˜ that is resilient to a Θ( 1
n
)-fraction of adversarial errors
and which incurs only a constant blow-up in the communication complexity. Jain et al. require that
every party sends all of its outgoing messages in π to P*, who delivers each message to its recipient. π
is thus restricted to pairwise interactions with P*, all of which are protected via a two-party interactive
coding scheme. Whenever P* notices an error on a channel, he signals a rewind to every party. It is
important to note, however, that if a party Pi is silent for too long a period, P* may not realize that
there was an error on his channel with Pi, in which case the computation may continue, incorrectly,
for an extended period of time. Therefore, Jain et al. intersperse phases during which the parties
exchange regular protocol messages with “polling phases,” when P* checks in with each party about
its current state. Though CC(π˜) = c ·CC(π) for some constant c, the increase in work required of P*
is potentially undesireable.
1.2 Our Results
We present a compiler that converts any n-party protocol a new protocol that achieves a constant
information rate and is resilient to a Θ( 1
n
)-fraction of adversarial errors. Moreover, our scheme does
not incur a blowup in the communication complexity of any one party during the computation. We
assume that the network is complete and that the speaking order in the noiseless protocol is static.
Theorem 1. (Informal) There exists a compiler Comp and constants c > 1 and ǫ ∈ (0, 1) such
that for any n-party protocol π with static speaking order and complete communication links, Comp
compiles π into a new protocol π˜ such that:
1. CC(π˜) = c · CC(π).
2. Protocol π˜ is resilient to ǫ
n
-fraction of adversarial errors (with high probability).
3. The communication complexity of any party Pi is Θ
(
CC(π)
n
)
.
Item 3. above only holds when the communication of the original protocol is balanced among the
parties, and the base protocol of [JKL15] can be suitably modified to preserve this, except for the
undue burden it places on the coordinator. We discuss this in more detail in Section 2.4.
Our Techniques In [JKL15], the special party that coordinates the computation simulates the error-free
computation and maintains a global view, rewinding when necessary to correct errors and frequently
speaking with all other parties to detect any errors that have not yet been revealed. A natural idea
for distributing the work of this special party is to break the computation into “chunks” (similar to
[BK12]) and have a different party serve as the coordinator for each individual chunk simulation. The
basic difficulty in implementing this approach is that we need a new mechanism for efficiently checking
for past errors. In [BK12], where chunks are also simulated individually, hashes of the entire simulated
transcript so far are used to determine if the previous chunks have been properly simulated. If these
hashes reveal inconsistencies in the old chunks, the simulation process rewinds and re-simulates older
chunks under the discrepancies are resolved. This is crucial to success against a significant error rate, as
many individual chunk simulations may be corrupted, and moving on from these and not periodically
rechecking them will lead to an incorrect result.
However, we cannot simply use hashes of the entire past transcript to check consistency as in
[BK12], because our chunk coordinator is now rotating, and does not have a full view of the past chunk
simulations when it was not serving as the chunk coordinator. To address this issue without incurring
a super-constant blowup in total communication, we apply hashing not to the naked transcripts, but
to previous hashes concatenated with the most recent chunk transcript. These previous hashes can
be passed from an old coordinator to a new one at each chunk without increasing the communication
complexity by more than a constant factor. One subtlety in ensuring that the communication load
per party remains balanced over time is that the same party may be asked for the same old hashes
more than once as the protocol attempts to resimulate a particular chunk multiple times. We address
this by allowing a party to refuse to communicate under certain circumstances and for the protocol
to continue anyway via a timeout mechanism. Our analysis further shows that these refusals do not
prevent our simulation from making progress when the error rate is suitably bounded.
Ultimately, the compression of previous transcripts into iterated hashes plus the message passing
of hashes between coordinators results in a more evenly distributed protocol without sacrificing total
communication complexity or error rate (up to constant factors). We view this as a necessary first
step in adapting and expanding multi-party interactive coding techniques to be more appropriate for a
truly distributed setting. Ultimately, we would like to see such techniques extended to achieve stronger
error-resilience for a wider variety of multi-party tasks, including classical distributed computing tasks
like Byzantine agreement.
1.3 Additional Related Work
There have been several works improving on the (1/240)-fraction of adversarial of errors allowed by
Shulman’s original (two party) protocol. Braverman and Rao improved significantly on the tolerable
error rate, allowing 18 − ǫ with a binary alphabet or
1
4 − ǫ with a constant alphabet [BR11]. [AGS13]
and [GHS14] have improved the error rates beyond 14 by leveraging adaptivity.
Both of the compilers in [Sch93] and [BR11] rely on tree-codes, which we do not know how to
construct or decode efficiently. Recent work has made progress toward the efficient construction of
tree-codes. In the stochastic case, Gelles, Moitra, and Sahai [GMS11] showed that a weaker form of
tree codes is sufficient, and thus improved on the protocols of [Sch92], [Sch93], and [RS94].
Brakerski and Kalai [BK12] considered the problem with adversarial error and presented an efficient
version of Schulman’s compiler. [BN13] improved upon the computation complexity of Brakerski and
Kalai’s construction. More recently, [GH14] provided a simple scheme for efficiently simulating any
two-party protocol, achieving optimal communication and error rates. The works of [GH14,BE14]
also consider list-decoding for interactive communication, while the works of [KR13,Hae14] study the
channel capacity for interactive communication.
2 Preliminaries
In this section, we fix notations and definitions that we will rely on throughout the paper. We will
begin with description of the noiseless protocol and then move on to a description of the two-party
protocol from [Sch93] and the multiparty protocol from [JKL15], both of which we will rely on in our
own construction.
2.1 The Noiseless Protocol
Let π be the noiseless protocol for the n parties P1, . . . , Pn. We consider the case where each message
in π consists of a single bit, since this is the “hardest” case. Moreover, we assume that messages are
sent sequentially, so that only when a party Pi receives a message from some Pj does Pi send a new
message to some Pk, as dictated by the static speaking order of π. We assume that the first party to
speak in π does so after receiving a dummy message. At any point during the computation of π when
it is some Pi’s turn to speak we can describe the next-message function NMi. Let X = x1, x2, . . . , xn
denote the inputs of P1, P2, . . . , Pn and Bℓ−1 = b1, . . . , bℓ−1 denote the first ℓ − 1 messages of π.
Finally, let transi be the partial protocol transcript observed by Pi. Then bℓ = NMi(xi; transi).
Let L = CC(π). The entire transcript of π corresponds to a unique path from the root to a leaf of
a binary tree of depth L, which we will denote by T . Each node of T corresponds to a party Pi, and
each arc corresponds to a message sent in π, either a 0 or a 1. If there is an arc from a node labeled Pj
of depth ℓ to a node labeled Pk via an arc labeled b on the path in T corresponding to the transcript
of π, then the ℓth message of π is the bit b sent from Pj to Pk.
2.2 More Details of Our Model
We consider an adversary that’s computationally unbounded and can flip bits anywhere. The adversary
is only constrained to having a specific error budget over the lifetime of the protocol.
In our measurement of communication complexity, we allow for a timeout mechanism, whereby
a party that does not want to send requested information can signal that by not replying in a fixed
amount of time. We do not count this in the communication complexity.
Finally, William Hoza [Hoz14] observed that adding links between parties can be used to tolerate
an arbitrarily high error-rate. If Alice and Bob are connected by two channels and the adversary cannot
insert or delete bits, but only alter their contents, then Alice can communicate ‘0’ to Bob by only
using the first channel, and ‘1’ by only using the second. In this way, Bob can decode Alice’s messages
perfectly even without looking at the contents. We assume that there is only one path between parties,
so we leave this as a topic for future work.
2.3 Schulman’s Two-Party Compiler
Here we give a brief overview of a slight variant on Schulman’s compiler [Sch93], as described in
[JKL15]. Let π = 〈P1, P2〉 be any two-party protocol. For the error-resilient protocol π˜,
Let π be the noiseless protocol and T be the protocol tree for π. For the error-resilient protocol π˜,
each party is equipped with a pebble αi which points to a node in T . T is padded to include dummy
nodes at the bottom of the tree so that the height of the tree equals the length of the simulation. At
any point, the movement of αi can be described by 0, meaning that it moved down to the left child,
1, meaning that it moved down to the right child, H , meaning that it stayed put, and B, meaning
that it moved back to the parent node. The movement of each pebble can be described by a 4-ary tree
where each arc is labeled 0, 1, H or B. This 4-ary tree is called a history tree, and is denoted HT .
The two parties also share a 4-ary tree code T C of depth N over an alphabet Σ of constant size c,
which they use to encode and decode each others’ pebble movements. We are now ready to describe
the steps taken by P1 upon receiving a message from P2, which are symmetric to those taken by P2
upon receipt of a message from P1.
1. Guess P2’s pebble position: Let ν = ν1, . . . , νk be the sequence of tree-code symbols νi that
P1 has received from P2 so far. P1 guesses the history h˜ist2 of pebble moves made by P2 such
that the hamming distance ∆(T C(h˜ist2, τ ) is minimized. P1 uses h˜ist2 to compute α˜2, its guess
for P2’s pebble position in T .
2. Compute the next pebble move: There are several cases depending on the relative positions
of α1 and α˜2.
– If α1 = α˜2, then in P1’s view, P1 and P2 are in the same position in T . If it is P1’s turn
to speak, then he computes τ = NM1(x1, trans), where trans is the concatenation of the arcs
along the path from the root of T to α1. Otherwise, it is P2’s turn to speak, in which case P1
sets τ = H .
– Otherwise, if α1 is the parent of α˜2 and P2 is the label of the node pointed to by α1, then P2
has sent a message to P1, and P1 should set τ = 0 (respectively, 1) if α˜2 is the left (respectively,
right) child of α1.
– Otherwise, if α1 is an ancestor of α˜2, then P2 may have moved along an incorrect path in T .
Therefore, P1 sets τ = H and waits for P2 to move back up the tree.
– Otherwise, if the least common ancestor of α1 and α˜2 is a strict ancestor of α1, then in P1’s
view, P1 and P2 have diverged onto different paths in T . Therefore, P1 sets τ = B in order to
back up to the point of consistency in T .
Now that P1 has computed its next pebble move τ , it moves α1 accordingly.
3. Send next symbol to P2: Let hist1 be the history of P1’s pebble moves made during the
computation of π˜. P1 computes ν = T C(hist1) where ν = ν1, . . . , ν|hist1|. P1 sends ν|hist1| to P2.
2.4 Jain et al.’s Multi-Party Compiler
First, we give the main theorem from [JKL15] and then give a high-level overview of their compiler.
Theorem 2 ([JKL15]). There exists a compiler Comp and constants c > 1 and ǫ′ ∈ (0, 1) such that
for any n-party protocol π′ = 〈P1, . . . , Pn〉, with static speaking order and at least one party Pi that
shares a communication link with all parties {Pj}j 6=i. Comp compiles π
′ into a new protocol π˜′ such
that:
1. CC(π˜′) = c · CC(π′).
2. π˜′ is resilient to ( ǫ
′
n
)−fraction of (adversarial) errors in the total communication.
3. The runtime of each party Pi is at most 2
O(n·Cmax), where Cmax is the maximum number of bits
sent and received by any party Pj in the underlying protocol π
′.
Jain et al. designate one party P* who shares a communication link with all other parties to “lead”
the protocol. The network operates as a star network with P* as the hub node. π′ is thus decomposed
into pairwise protocols π1, . . . , πn where πi denotes the two-party protocol for communication between
P* and Pi. P* shares the protocol tree Ti for πi with each Pi. P*’s copy of this tree is denoted Ti*.
[JKL15] splits the simulation of π into a sequence of phases. The phases alternate between protocol
phases and polling phases. Θ(n) bits are exchanged during each phase. During the protocol phases,
each Pi follows the two-party protocol simulation strategy, since he is only communicating through
P*. Meanwhile, every time P* receives a message, he computes the “global consistency point” in the
protocol tree T for π. If this is further up the tree than the current node of the simulation, then P*
signals a rewind, telling parties to back up until every party has returned to the section of T that
is error free. During the polling phases, each party Pi sends a tree code symbol indicating its pebble
position in the two-party protocol tree for πi. Therefore, if some party speaks much less often compared
to other parties, an error in his computation history will still be detected in a timely manner.
In order to achieve an overall balance of communication among the players, we will need to use a
variant of [JKL15]’s compiler that achieves such a balance, up to the imbalanced burden played on
the special coordinator P ∗. Naturally, one cannot hope to achieve a constant multiplicative overhead
in the total communication complexity and a O( 1
n
) relative complexity for each party if the original
(noiseless) protocol does not have balanced communication. However, even when the original protocol
does have relatively balanced communication complexity over the n parties, the protocol of [JKL15]
does not preserve this. The glaringly obvious violation is the disproportionate burden on P ∗, but
there is a more subtle potential violation as well. As P ∗ attempts to simulate the error-free transcript
during the non-polling phases of the protocol, it may adaptively speak with whatever party it deems
relevant based on its current (possibly wrong) view, potentially causing communication to become
unbalanced among the regular parties.
There are several cases in which this undesirable behavior of the [JKL15] protocol can be avoided.
One case is if the underlying (noiseless) protocol is actually synchronous, proceeding in rounds in
which each party sends the same number of bits. In such a setting, P ∗ can simply collect the messages
from all parties for each round and simulate rounds in a balanced way. Polling phases can then be
eliminated and the analysis given in [JKL15] to ensure successful simulation with an error rate of
Θ( 1
n
) and a constant multiplicative overhead in total communication complexity still applies.
Another case is where the underlying protocol is asynchronous, but proceeds in balanced windows
of communication where each party speaks once (and sends the same number of bits). For example,
consider a protocol that consists of P1 sending a bit, then P2, then P3, and so on, simply going through
the parties one by one in a fixed order. The coordinator P ∗ of the [JKL15] protocol could then proceed
to speak with parties in this same ordering, and again separate polling phases could be eliminated.
More precisely, the P ∗ in this case will still maintain a view of a “global consistency point” in the
overall protocol tree where he believes the other parties need to rewind too, but he will work in units
that correspond to the communication windows and stick to the fixed speaking order while attempting
to rewind parties back to this point and learn new information (so the global consistency point will
always be defined as the beginning of a window). Intuitively, since the [JKL15] protocol can tolerate
waiting for a polling phase for P ∗ to speak to a particular party and discover a previous error, this
approach can also tolerate a Θ( 1
n
) error rate.
To see this more formally, we can tweak the analysis given in [JKL15] by defining an adjusted
measure of progress. Our measureM could be defined (in window units) as follows. We let depth(gcp)
denote the window index of the true global consistency point in the noiseless n-party protocol tree.
For each party Pi, we let d(i, gcp) denote the number of number of windows away from gcp that P
∗’s
and Pi’s pebbles are in their 2-party simulation. We then define:
M := depth(gcp)−max
i∈[n]
{d(i, gcp)}
Analogously to [JKL15], we can then define a good window as a window where all the symbols are
received correctly by P ∗ and each party Pi and that all parties have correctly guessed the positions
of all pebbles. In such a window, we claim that M will strictly increase. To see this, we note that if
d(i, gcp) = 0 for all i, then P ∗ will successfully simulate a new window, and depth(gcp) will increase.
If d(i, gcp) > 0 for some values of i, all of these parties will move their pebbles appropriately during
the window in order to decrease maxi∈[n]{d(i, gcp)}.
We similarly claim that any non-good window can only decrease M by a constant amount. First,
it is clear that depth(gcp) can only change by a constant amount, and since d(i, gcp) only changes by
a constant amount for each i, the max can also only change by a constant.
Now an analysis common to [JKL15] and [Sch92] easily applies: we can take every non-good window
and argue that it is contained in a bad interval that contains a Ω( 1
n
) fraction of errors. If any symbol in
the window itself is corrupted, then that window serves as a suitable bad interval (since O(n) symbols
are sent per window). Otherwise, the constant rate of the tree code and the fact that every party
sends one symbol per window means that we take a backward-stretching interval including a number
of windows proportional to the depth of the worst tree-decoding error as a suitable bad interval. As in
[JKL15], we can then see that a constant multiplicative overhead in the number of window simulations
then suffices to insure a correct simulation of the underlying protocol.
It is worth noting that our approach for passing off the duties of P ∗ from party to party is rather
modular, and does not depend upon the precise details of how P ∗ simulates a piece of the protocol.
Thus, other variants of [JKL15] or other base protocols that equalize communication complexity
among parties except for a heavy burden on P ∗ could also be inserted into our protocol to obtain
analogous results.
2.5 Hash Functions
We use a family of hash functions index by keys k ∈ {0, 1}t. In particular, we invoke the following
theorem of [NN93], [AGHP92].
Theorem 3. [[NN93], [AGHP92]] There exists a constant q > 0 and an ensemble of hash families
and an ensemble of hash families {HN}N∈N such that for every N ∈ N and for every h ∈ HN ,
h : {0, 1}≤2
N
→ {0, 1}qN is poly-time computable, it is efficient to sample h ← HN using only qN
random bits, and for all y 6= z ∈ {0, 1}≤2
N
it holds that
Pr
h←HN
[h(y) = h(z)] ≤ 2−N .
We set t = qN and write hk : {0, 1}
≤2N → {0, 1}t to denote the element of HN sampled with
the random string k ∈ {0, 1}t. We also let {Enc1, Dec1} and {Enc2, Dec2} denote two pairs of
encoding and decoding algorithms of error-correcting codes with constant rates β and a constant
relative distance λ. In particular, we have
Enc1 : {0, 1}
2t → {0, 1}2βt
and
Enc2 : {0, 1}
nt → {0, 1}βnt.
3 Our Compiler
3.1 Overview
Our compiler consists of two main phases: chunk simulations and consistency checks. These two phases
make up a single “iteration” of π˜. A chunk refers to a section of T such that the chunk indexed by j
includes all nodes in T of depth greater than or equal to jk and less than (j + 1)k for a parameter
k that we will define. The parties will sequentially take turns serving as P* for a chunk simulation,
during which time the protocol from [JKL15] (adapted as described in Section 2.4) will be run. Each
Pi is equipped with variable γi, set to 0 at the beginning of the protocol execution, which indicates
the chunk that the party is currently simulating. Also, as in [JKL15], each party is equipped with a
pebble αi which points to the root of Ti, as well as pebbles αi* with which to lead the simulation
during their turn as P*.
During the consistency checks, the parties ensure that they are all simulating the same chunk of
T and they rewind if they are out of sync. If there is a rewind, the new leader Pnew* must be able
to request information from the old leader Pold* who led the simulation during the chunk Pnew* has
backed up to. We later refer to this as “tapping” Pold*. Pnew* must have a way of checking that the
entire computation of π has been correct, even though he was not the leader for most of the chunks.
Therefore, we require each party to store information about the computation of each chunk so that
they can ensure the correctness of the simulation so far. This data, which we will describe in detail
later in this section, is stored in a vector, which we call ρi for each Pi. Pi’s data regarding the jth
chunk of T is stored in ρi[j]. Pi may write over data stored in any ρi[j] if the jth chunk of T is
simulated multiple times during the computation.
Let CC(π) = L. The simulation is stopped after a total of 5L symbols have been exchanged. We
let m be a constant positive integer such that it takes mk exchanges to simulate a chunk using the
protocol from [JKL15]. There are at least 4nβt bits exchanged during the remainder of an iteration
of π˜, where β is the constant rate of the encoding algorithms and t is the length of the hash function
output. We set 4nβt = mk, so that the number of bits exchanged during the simulation of a chunk via
the protocol in [JKL15] is at least the number of bits exchanged during the remainder of an iteration
in π˜. Therefore, k, the depth of each chunk, is set to be 4nβt/m.
At the beginning of a chunk, P* will begin communication with the Pk that is the label of the first
node of the chunk in T . For the remainder of the chunk simulation, communication among parties
will follow the protocol described in [JKL15].
We will first describe the initial iteration of π˜ and then an arbitrary jth iteration of π˜ for j > 1.
3.2 The first iteration
P1, as P*, will progress through the first chunk of T , following the protocol described in [JKL15].
Now we give a high level overview of the first consistency check. Each Pi hashes his transcript from T〉
and stores it in ρi[0]. In the next iteration, he will concatenate this hashed value with the transcript
from the second chunk and store it in ρi[1], and so on. During the consistency check, each party Pi
sends this hashed value to P* and P* computes his own version of this hash value for each Pi. If the
hashed values all match up with P*’s n computed values, then P* sends F (“forward”) to each party.
Otherwise, P* tells the parties to back up to the beginning of the chunk by sending B1 (“back up
one chunk”) to each party. (In future iterations, P* may send B2 to a party Pi in order to have the
party back up to chunk number ℓ− 1 if γi = ℓ.) Specifically, the following steps occur during the first
consistency check:
1. Each Pi computes its hash value and sends it and γi to P*: For all i ∈ [2, · · · , n], let σi,0
be the local transcript of the two-party protocol in Ti corresponding to the first chunk of T . Set
ψi,0 := σi,0. Pi samples ki ← H and sends Enc1(Hki(ψi,0) || ki) to P*. We denote received hash
values by adding a tilde above the H , so we say that P* receives H˜ki(ψi,0) from each Pi.
2. P* computes its corresponding hash value: For all i ∈ [2, · · · , n], let ψi,0* be P*’s local
transcript of the two-party protocol in the first chunk of Ti*. P* computes the corresponding
Hki(ψi,0*).
3. P* compares the hash values: We say that the chunk was good if for all i, H˜ki(ψi,0) =
Hki(ψi,0*). Otherwise, we say the chunk was bad.
4. The parties store their hash values: For all i ∈ [2, . . . , n], Pi stores Hki(ψi,0) in ρi[0] and P1,
who is acting as P*, stores {{Hki(ψi,0*)}, Hk1(ψ1,0)} in ρ1[0], where {Hki(ψi,0*)} = {Hk1(ψ1,0*),
Hk2(ψ2,0*),..., Hkn(ψn,0*)}.
5. P* directs the parties to move forward or rewind: If the chunk was good, P* sends Enc1(F )
to each Pi, and P1 increments γ1. Otherwise, P* sends Enc1(B1) to each Pi.
6. Each party updates its chunk and pebble: For all i ∈ [2, . . . , n], let Xi be the symbol Pi
received from P* in Step 5, depending on whether the chunk was good or bad. Now, each Pi sets
γi ← chunkUpdate(Xi, γi, αi).
chunkUpdate(Xi, γi, αi):
– If Xi = F , then increment γi.
– If Xi = B1, then set αi to point to the first node in Ti that is a node in the γith chunk.
– If Xi = B2, then set αi to point to the first node in Ti that is a node in the (γi − 1)th chunk in
Ti. Then decrement γi.
3.3 The jth iteration
Chunk Simulation Suppose it is P ′ℓs turn to act as P*. Let s be the index of the chunk of T that
Pℓ will simulate. First, each Pi sends Enc1(γi) to P*, which it decodes using Dec1. Either γi = s for
all i, or there is some i for which the two values differ, and P* acts accordingly:
– If γi = s for all i, then P* requests {Hki(αi,s−1*)} from the party it believes acted as P* during
the simulation of chunk number s − 1, say Pk during time interval j. P* will request this set of
hashes by sending Enc1(j) to Pk. If Pk has already sent this set of hashes during a different chunk
simulation, then he will ignore this message from P*. This is crucial to prove the third part of
Theorem 1. Otherwise, he will send Enc2({Hki(αi,s−1*)}) to P*.
Meanwhile, P* will wait a specified amount of time for Pk to respond to his message. If P* does
not receive the set of hashes, then the transaction has “timed out,” and P* sends garbage symbols
for the entirety of the chunk simulation. Otherwise, P* receives the set of hashes from Pk, and
P* leads the chunk simulation following the protocol described in [JKL15].
– If γi 6= s for some i, then there is no way for the chunk simulation to be successful. Therefore, P*
sends garbage symbols for the entirety of the chunk simulation.
Consistency Check After the chunk simulation, the following set of computations and exchanges
will occur.
1. Each party Pi computes its hash value: Let σi,γi be the local transcript of the two-party
protocol in Ti corresponding to the γith chunk of T . Set
ψi,γi = σi,γi || ρi[γi − 1].
Then Pi then samples ki ← H and sends Enc1(Hki(ψi,γi) || ki) to P* and sets ρi[γi] = Hki(ψi,γi).
2. P* computes its corresponding hash value: For each i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, P* creates its version of
the concatenated transcripts it received from Pi. Recall that at the beginning of the iteration, P*
may have received the set {H
k˜i
(ψi,s−1*)}, where from the party that P* believes most recently
led the computation of chunk number s − 1 of T . (Here we use k˜i to denote the key sampled by
each Pi during the previous iteration in question.) If P* didn’t receive this set of hashes, either
because it did not ask or because the operation timed out, then it skips to Step 4 and stores
garbage values in ρi[s]. Otherwise, let σi,s* be P*’s local transcript from the two-party protocol
in Ti* corresponding to chunk number s of T . Set
ψi,s* = σi,s* || Hk˜i(ψi,s−1*).
Then P* applies the hash function Hki to ψi,s* to get Hki(ψi,s*). Since Pℓ is currently acting as
P*, it stores {{Hki(ψi,s*)}
n
i=1, Hkℓ(ψℓ,s)} in ρℓ[s].
3. P* compares the hash values: If H˜ki(ψi,s) = Hki(ψi,s*) for all i ∈ {1, . . . n}, then this chunk
was good. Otherwise, it was bad.
4. P* directs the parties to move forward or rewind: If the chunk was good, then P* sends
Enc1(F ) to each Pi, and Pℓ increments γℓ.
Otherwise, the chunk was bad. Recall that at the beginning of the chunk simulation, each Pi
sent Enc1(γi) to P*. Let cβ be the smallest value of γi for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, as computed
by P*. If γi = cβ and H˜ki(ψi,s) = Hki(ψi,s*), then P* sends Enc1(B1) to Pi. Otherwise, P*
sends Enc1(B2) to Pi. Finally Pℓ = P* sets γℓ ← chunkUpdate(B1, γℓ, αℓ) if cβ = γℓ and γℓ ←
chunkUpdate(B2, γℓ, αℓ) otherwise.
5. Each party updates its chunk and pebble: For all i ∈ {1, . . . , n} \ {ℓ}, let Xi be the symbol
Pi received from P* in Step 4. Now each Pi sets γi ← chunkUpdate(Xi, γi, αi).
4 Measuring Progress
In the following section, we prove the success of our simulation conditioned on the event that there
are no hash collisions over the course of the computation. Since there are 5nL
k
hash values computed
over the course of the simulation, by Theorem 3 and a union bound, the probability that there is no
hash collision at any point during the computation is at least
1−
5nL
k
· 2−N .
Therefore, if we want to ensure the success of the simulation with probability 1− 2−γ for some γ, we
can set
N ≥ γ + log(5nL).
t = qN is set accordingly.
Now, we must define a measure of progress that we can compute at each iteration during the
protocol. We will show that by the end of the simulation, the measure of progress is sufficiently high
as to ensure success. To this end, let ξ be the node in T where the first error occurred. Say ξ is in
chunk cξ. Now, let cβ be the chunk such that:
– cβ ≤ cξ,
– the party who most recently led the correct simulation cβ has not yet been tapped for the set of
hashes from cβ , and
– for all chunks ck ≤ cβ , every party is in agreement about which party simulated ck most recently
and during which time interval the simulation occurred.
Intuitively, if there have been errors, cβ is the chunk that all of the parties must back up to in order
to continue the correct simulation of π. Recall that we equip each party Pj with a variable γj that
allows them to keep track of which chunk of T he thinks the protocol execution is currently in.
We are concerned with two types of error:
1. External chunk error: For some j ∈ [1, . . . , n], γj 6= cβ .
2. Internal chunk error: For all j ∈ [1, . . . , n], γj = cβ, but errors have occurred in the execution
of chunk cβ .
Suppose that there are external chunk errors. Let Pj be the party “furthest ahead” of the other
parties, so γj ≥ γk for all k 6= j. Then there must be at least γj − cβ consistency checks before all
parties have backed up to chunk cβ , and can start making progress again. Therefore, we define the
measure of progress to be
M = cβ − (γj − cβ) = 2cβ − γj .
First, we give a lower bound on the number of errors injected in an iteration that could causeM to
decrease. Let ǫ′ be the constant from Theorem 2 such that the protocol in [JKL15] is resilient to an ǫ
′
n
-
fraction of error. Recall that the smallest codeword sent outside of the chunk simulation protocol from
[JKL15] in any iteration of π˜ is 2βt bits, and that our encoding and decoding algorithms have constant
relative distance λ. Then it takes 2λβt bit flips to corrupt one word, and since there are at most 10nβt
bits exchanged outside of the [JKL15] protocol in each iteration, these exchanges are resilient to a
λ
5n -fraction of errors. Therefore, if we set ǫ = min{ǫ
′, λ/5}, then both the chunk simulation protocol
and the other exchanges during the iteration are resilient to an ǫ
n
-fraction of errors.
To prove the correctness of the simulation, we first analyze the change in M during “good” and
“bad” iterations. We say that an iteration is good if the subprotocol from [JKL15] is not overwhelmed
by errors and if every party correctly decodes every other message sent during the iteration. Otherwise,
we say the iteration is bad.
Throughout the following analysis, let Pj be the party with a maximum γj value.
Claim. A good iteration increases M by at least 1.
Proof. If γj = cβ , then a good iteration will increment cβ, so M will increase by 1. If γj 6= cβ , then
Pj will decrement γj by 1. In this case, cβ will remain the same. To see this, note that if there is any
discrepancy among the parties regarding their γi values, then P* will not request the set of hashes
from any party, so cβ will not shift. Moreover, if γi = γk for all i, k ∈ [1, . . . , n], then P* may request a
hash set from a previous P*, but since γi 6= cβ, that exchange will not effect the value of cβ . Therefore,
M will increase by 1.
Claim. If the iteration is bad, M will decrease by at most 3.
Proof. cβ may move back by at most one during any iteration. This may happen in the case that
either
– Some Pi such that γi = cβ jumps back when he should hold. In this case cβ decreases by 1.
– The party who had most recently led the correct simulation of cβ was tapped for his hashes, and
therefore will never send them again. If the simulation of cβ is not successful, then cβ will decrease
by one.
Also, γj can increase by at most one during any iteration, in the case where Pj , or some Pk such
that γk = γj , moves forward when he should jump back.
Therefore, M decreases by at most 3.
We are now ready to prove the resiliency of our simulation.
Lemma 1. When running π˜ over a channel that makes at most
E =
5ǫL
8n
adversarial errors, π˜ correctly simulates π.
Proof. The simulation is stopped after a total of 5L symbols have been exchanged, where CC(π) = L.
Recall that k is the depth of a chunk and m is a constant positive integer such that it takes mk
exchanges to simulate a chunk via the protocol in [JKL15] and at least 4nβt = mk exchanges to
complete the remainder of an interaction in π˜. We will show that
cβ >
L
k
by the end of the simulation, ensuring its correctness. To this end, we define the potential function
ϕ = (2cβ − γj)k +
4n
ǫm
E.
(We abuse notation above and use E to refer to an accumulating variable for the number of errors so
far in the computation.)
Let ϕℓ denote the change in ϕ in iteration ℓ, ℓ ∈ {1, . . . ,
5L
k
}. We claim that ϕℓ ≥ k for all ℓ.
From Claim 4, we know that if iteration ℓ is good, then M = 2cβ − γj increases by one, so ϕℓ ≥ k.
Meanwhile, if iteration ℓ is bad, then M decreases by at most three. However, this means that there
were at least ǫmk
n
errors, enough to overwhelm the chunk simulation protocol from [JKL15], the other
exchanges that occurred during the ℓth iteration, or both. Therefore, E increased by at least ǫmk
n
, so
ϕℓ ≥ −3k + 4k = k.
Since there are 5L
k
iterations during the simulation, ϕ ≥ 5L by the time it finishes. Now, we know
that at the end of the simulation, (2cβ − γj)k ≥ 5L/2 or
4n
ǫm
E ≥ 5L/2. However, the latter would
imply that
E ≥
5ǫLm
8n
>
5ǫL
8n
,
which is a contradiction. Therefore,
5L
2
≤ (2cβ − γj)k ≤ 2cβk,
so
L
k
<
5L
4k
≤ cβ ,
as desired.
We conclude with a proof of Theorem 1.
Proof (Proof (Theorem 1)). The first part of Theorem 1 is clear by construction, since we require
that CC(π˜) = 5L = 5CC(π). The second part of Theorem 1 follows from Lemma 1. Finally, each
party will be required to serve as P* for no more than ⌈ 5L
kn
⌉ chunks and also must forward his hash
sets to another P* no more than ⌈ 5L
kn
⌉ times. Therefore, the increase in communication required when
simulating π˜ is split evenly among the parties, so the communication complexity of any party Pi is
Θ
(
CC(π)
n
)
.
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